

Common Access Card (CAC) Operational Requirements Document (ORD) Executive Summary

Background:

Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) 96 and the Chairman's Program Requirements (CPR) 97 directed the Services to fund for smart card technology as an individual data storage carrier for the personnel piece of TAV. Additionally, within the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) Memorandum (JROCM) (Smart Card Technology), the JROC directed an Integrated Product Team be formed to determine the best type of smart card technology to meet the warfighting requirement. In December of 1997, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the Mission Needs Statement (MNS) for a DoD-wide Smart Card and designated the program as Joint.

On November 10, of 1999, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Hamre, published a memorandum on Smart Card adoption and implementation, which directed "all DoD Components to take actions necessary to implement the use of a standard DoD smart card." Furthermore, the initial implementation of smart card technology was directed to be a Department-wide common access card (CAC). The Department of the Navy was directed to take the lead in preparing a smart card Operational Requirements Document (ORD), for submission to the JROC no later than January 31, 2000. This memorandum also formally established the Smart Card Senior Coordinating Group (SCSCG).

Smart Card / CAC ORD First Iteration:

In April of 2000, the Navy Smart Card Office (working under the Department of the Navy Chief Information Office (DON CIO)) forwarded a draft ORD via the Joint Staff J8 for formal Joint 0-6 level staffing (see accompanying file "ORD 1st Iteration Apr 2000"). The document was simultaneously staffed to the Navy 0-6 chop chain. This draft did not conform entirely to the requirements of Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01A, the Requirements Generation System. Not only was the ORD not in full compliance with CJCSI 3170.01A, its structure was somewhat unclear at first glance in that it detailed requirements for two separate entities in the same document. The first of these were general "requirements for smart card technology of the Joint smart card

programs.” Secondly, specific requirements for the DoD Common Access Card were indicated in italics. No advance harmonization with the other services was accomplished before the ORD was sent to formal staffing; the result was that over 350 adverse comments were received in July 2000 from the formal Joint 0-6 level staffing.

Smart Card ORD Second Iteration:

The Navy Smart Card Office contracted Whitney, Bradley and Brown, Inc. (WBB), a consulting firm in Vienna, Virginia, to aid in developing a process for proper requirements generation / definition and writing a CJCSI 3170 compliant ORD. One of the first efforts was a Navy focus session held in August 2000. This session was attended by representatives from the major OPNAV “N” Codes and served to educate the OPNAV staff on the vision and functionality of a DoD-wide smart card. Participants discussed potential issues with the ORD and means for resolving those issues. In September 2000, a facilitated collaborative session was held with representatives from all four service’s smart card offices, the Joint Staff J4 & J8, the DoD Access Card Office (ACO), DISA, NSA and GSA. Participants came to a consensus on the performance parameters and their threshold and objective values for the ORD. They identified which performance parameters should be designated as KPPs and outlined a first draft of the information exchange requirements for a DoD Smart Card. Numerous ORD rewrites and incorporation of the first draft ORD staffing comments were accomplished over the next few months, along with successful liaison with the Joint Staff J8 & J4 and the DoD ACO to ensure that the ORD reflected the needs of the warfighter and the direction the technology was taking the ACO.

In January 2001, WBB delivered a staffing-ready draft version of an ORD for the DoD Smart Card (not CAC-specific) to the Navy Smart Card Office. The Navy Smart Card Office forwarded a courtesy copy of this document to all of the service’s smart card offices and the ACO for an informal review prior to sending it to the Joint Staff J8 for formal 0-6 level staffing. The complete rewrite of the document, plus the large number of adverse comments received on the initial round of Joint 0-6 staffing of the first iteration ORD, dictated this approach as directed by J8. Around the same time the philosophy and approach of the DoN CIO was changed; in late February 2001, the DoN

CIO directed that the ORD be rewritten to reflect requirements specifically for the CAC, vice a DoD-wide Smart Card.

In April 2001 this revised ORD (see accompanying file “ORD 2nd Iteration Apr 2001”), now CAC-focused, was sent to Navy 0-6 staffing, and in May 2001, to the J8 for formal Joint and service 0-6 level staffing. Formal staffing was completed in July 2001 with 7 non-concurs received. Most of these reflected dissatisfaction from the services and Combatant Commanders who had reviewed the courtesy copy they were given in January, in that many of the requirements that reflected benefits to the warfighter had been removed.

Smart Card ORD Third Iteration:

From July through September of 2001 the ORD was rewritten to reflect the staffing comments and incorporate needed changes as a result of the release of the new CJCSI 3170.01B of April 2001. In October 2001, functions of the Navy Smart Card Office were transferred to the Navy eBusiness Operations Office (eBUSOPSOFF, still under DoN CIO) at Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. The eBUSOPSOFF evaluated the strategic direction of the ORD, re-engaged WBB, and in March 2002 approached the Joint Staff J8 with a proposition to discontinue rewriting the ORD and staffing in light of the fact that the CAC was already being fielded. However, the J8 reaffirmed that the Joint staff expected to see an ORD presented to the J8 for staffing and forwarding to the JROC. Thru DoN CIO, the eBUSOPSOFF was tasked to finish rewriting the ORD and re-staff it. The direction was that the ORD be rewritten as a CAC ORD to comply with the new CJCSI 3170.01B and be prepared for submission to Joint 0-6 staffing by September 1, 2002.

In June of 2002, a determination was made that OPNAV N6 would be the official Navy sponsor of the ORD, in collaboration with the eBUSOPSOFF, with the actual ORD staff work performed under contract by WBB. A significant effort was undertaken to informally brief each of the Service’s smart card offices on the direction and status of the

ORD and prepare them for what they would see in the revised ORD. The ORD was subsequently modified and improved to reflect their concerns and suggestions. Additionally, discussions were held with the Joint Staff J6, JFCOM J6, JI&I and the GIG CRD lead to ensure that interoperability requirements were addressed appropriately in the document. On November 15, 2002 the ORD was sent out for simultaneous formal Navy 0-6 and Joint/Service 0-6 level staffing by OPNAV N810 and J8 respectively.

In January 2003 final roll-up comments from Navy and Joint staffing were received and delivered to OPNAV N6 for adjudication and incorporation in a revised ORD. There were 5 non-concurs from this round of staffing. Another round of liaison with the reviewers who made critical and substantive comments was conducted to collaboratively reach an agreement on contentious issues. This was achieved in every case. Interoperability issues, which had been previously addressed with J6, were again revisited with DISA and OSD C3I and resolved. Amicable solutions to service issues were found and the ORD was subsequently revised to reflect all needed changes. The result was a “third iteration” ORD ready for formal Flag / General Officer review (see accompanying file “ORD 3rd Iteration Mar 2003”). WBB returned the rewritten ORD and the adjudicated comments to OPNAV N6 and the eBUSOPSOFF in March 2003.

End Game:

In March-April 2003, OPNAV N6 staff met with OPNAV N810 and Joint Staff J8 staffers to discuss the status of the ORD and determine whether or not the Joint Staff was still intent on staffing it to the Flag / General Officers. The consensus was that an argument could be made for both cases: on the one hand, the CAC was already being fielded, having passed T&E, and therefore an ORD was a moot point; on the other hand, there was no requirements document for the CAC and therefore no set requirements to guide the future of the CAC. However, issues remained as to whether or not the CAC should become a program of record and what office should be suggested to the JROC as the approval authority for the ORD and responsible for updating it. The ultimate decision of the J8 was NOT to send the CAC ORD forward to the JROC process. It was felt that the following key issues would be difficult to deal with: 1) Should this be a program of

record?; 2) Who should own / maintain the ORD?; and 3) What is the true picture of CAC funding?

The final determination of the J8 was that at this point in the evolution and implementation of the CAC program, there was little or nothing to be gained from continuing with the ORD process. OPNAV N6 was instructed to simply not forward the document back to J8 for staffing; nor would the Navy need to send anything forward to J8 asking for relief from the Dr. Hamre memo that originally called for an ORD. The CAC ORD would quietly die.

Final Actions:

To capitalize on the ORD efforts undertaken over the past couple years, it was decided that copies of relevant ORD documentation should be made available to interested parties (e.g., the Access Card Office, Service smart card offices, etc.). This would provide a public audit trail of ORD documents should it ever become necessary in the future to revisit an ORD for the CAC or for smart cards in general.